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I.

INTRODUCTION

In April 1991, the Minnesota Supreme Court granted a petition by the Minnesota State Bar Association to amend Rule 8.4
of the Minnesota Rules of Professional Conduct.' Rule 8.4 governs
attorney misconduct, and the amendment, Rule 8.4(h), states
that it is professional misconduct for a lawyer to "commit a
discriminatory act, prohibited by federal, state, or local ordi1. Promulgation of Amendments to the Minnesota Rules of Professional Conduct-Rules 1.6, 8.3 and 8.4 (Minn. Order 92-4, Apr. 14, 1992).
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nance, that
reflects adversely on the lawyer's fitness as a
2
lawyer."
2. MINNESOTA RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 8.4(h) (1992). The recently amended rule reads in its entirety:
It is professional misconduct for a lawyer to:
(a) violate or attempt to violate the Rules of Professional Conduct,
knowingly assist or induce another to do so, or do so through the acts of
another;
(b) commit a criminal act that reflects adversely on the lawyer's honesty, trustworthiness or fitness as a lawyer in other respects;
(c) engage in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation;
(d) engage in conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of justice;
(e) state or imply an ability to influence improperly a government
agency or official;
(f) knowingly assist a judge or judicial officer in conduct that is a violation of applicable rules ofjudicial conduct or other law;
(g) harass a person on the basis of sex, race, age, creed, religion, color,
national origin, disability, sexual preference or marital status in connection
with a lawyer's professional activities;
(h) commit a discriminatory act, prohibited by federal, state or local
statute or ordinance, that reflects adversely on the lawyer's fitness as a lawyer. Whether a discriminatory act reflects adversely on a lawyer's fitness as a
lawyer shall be determined after consideration of all the circumstances, including (1) the seriousness of the act, (2) whether the lawyer knew that it
was prohibited by statute or ordinance, (3) whether it was part of a pattern
of prohibited conduct, and (4) whether it was committed in connection with
the lawyer's professional activities.
Id. The comment to the rule states:
Many kinds of illegal conduct reflect adversely on fitness to practice law,
such as offenses involving fraud and the offense of willful failure to file an
income tax return. Although a lawyer is personally answerable to the entire
criminal law, a lawyer should be professionally answerable only for offenses
that indicate lack of those characteristics relevant to the practice of law. Offenses involving violence, dishonesty, or breach of trust, or serious interference with the administration of justice are in that category. A pattern of
repeated offenses, even ones of minor significance when considered separately, can indicate indifference to legal obligation.
Lawyers holding public office assume legal responsibilities going beyond those of other citizens. A lawyer's abuse of public office can suggest an
inability to fulfill the professional role of attorney. The same is true of
abuse of positions of private trust such as trustee, executor, administrator,
guardian, agent and officer, director or manager of a corporation or other
organization.
Paragraph (g) specifies a particularly egregious type of discriminatory
act-harassment on the basis of sex, race, age, creed, religion, color, national origin, disability, sexual preference, or marital status. What constitutes harassment in this context may be determined with reference to
antidiscrimination legislation and case law thereunder. This harassment ordinarily involves the active burdening of another, rather than mere passive
failure to act properly.
Harassment on the basis of sex, race, age, creed, religion, color, national origin, disability, sexual preference, or marital status may violate
either paragraph (g) or paragraph (h). The harassment violates paragraph
(g) if the lawyer committed it in connection with the lawyer's professional
activities. Harassment, even if not committed in connection with the law-
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Other states, including NewJersey, New York, Rhode Island,
Vermont, and the District of Columbia, have amended their
professional codes to include antidiscrimination provisions.3
In addition, California, Massachusetts and Michigan are considering such amendments.4 The antidiscrimination provisions in other states seek merely to regulate a lawyer's conduct
either in an employment context or in connection with the lawyer's professional activities.5 By comparison, Minnesota's
amendment is far more extreme. Minnesota's new rule seeks
to regulate a lawyer's conduct not only in a professional capacity but also in the lawyer's private life.
This Comment examines the purpose and rationale of selfyer's professional activities, violates paragraph (h) if the harassment (1) is
prohibited by antidiscrimination legislation and (2) reflects adversely on the
lawyer's fitness as a lawyer, determined as specified in paragraph (h).
Paragraph (h) reflects the premise that the concept of human equality
lies at the very heart of our legal system. A lawyer whose behavior demonstrates hostility toward or indifference to the policy of equal justice under
the law may thereby manifest a lack of character required of members of the
legal profession. Therefore, a lawyer's discriminatory act prohibited by statute or ordinance may reflect adversely on his or her fitness as a lawyer even
if the unlawful discriminatory act was not committed in connection with the
lawyer's professional activities.
Whether an unlawful discriminatory act reflects adversely on fitness as a
lawyer is determined after consideration of all relevant circumstances including the four factors listed in paragraph (h). It is not required that the
listed factors be considered equally, nor is the list intended to be exclusive.
For example, it would also be relevant that the lawyer reasonably believed
that his or her conduct was protected under the state or federal constitution
or that the lawyer was acting in a capacity for which the law provides an
exemption from civil liability. See, e.g., Minn. Stat. Section 317A.257 (unpaid
director or officer of nonprofit organization acting in good faith and not
willfully or recklessly).
A lawyer may refuse to comply with an obligation imposed by law upon
a good faith belief that no valid obligation exists. The provisions of Rule
1.2(c)-(d) concerning a good faith challenge to the validity, scope, meaning
or application of the law apply to challenges of legal regulation of the practice of law.
Id. at cmt.
3. See DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 9.1 (1992);
NEW JERSEY RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 8.4(g) (1993); NEW YORK CODE
OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 1-102(A)(6) (1992); RHODE ISLAND RULES OF
PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 8.4(d) (1991-1992); VERMONT CODE OF PROFESSIONAL

RESPONSIBILITY DR 1-102(A)(6) (1986).
4. See Linda Mabus Jorgenson & Pamela K. Sutherland, Lawyer-Client Sexual Contact: State Bars Polled, 14 NAT'L L.J. 26 n.5 (1992) (discussing Massachusetts' proposed
antidiscrimination amendment); James K. Robinson, Discrimination and the Legal System, 69 MICH. B. J. 1252 (1990) (discussing Michigan's proposed antidiscrimination
amendment); Michael J. Hall, Committee of State Bar to Mull Bias Sanctions, L. A. DAILY
J., August 14, 1992, at 3 (discussing California's proposed antidiscrimination
amendment).
5. See infra notes 135-38 and accompanying text.
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regulation in the legal profession. This Comment further examines professional antidiscrimination regulations in various
states and draws a comparison to Minnesota's rule. After considering problems surrounding the new rule and the rule's implications for Minnesota practitioners, the Comment
concludes that Minnesota's new rule is not only an inappropriate means to implement social policy but also violates due
process.
II.

SELF REGULATION IN THE LEGAL PROFESSION AND THE

PURPOSE OF PROFESSIONAL LEGAL ETHICS CODES

A.

The History of Self-Regulation

Under early English law, lawyers were officers of the court
and therefore subject to supervision of the court. 6 In response
to public distrust of attorneys, 7 and increasing calls for reform
in the legal profession, the English bar developed a system of
self-regulation.8 By the turn of the twentieth century, the
American bar had embraced the English system of selfregulation.9
The American Bar Association's first attempt at promulgating rules governing attorney conduct resulted in the drafting
of the Canons of Professional Ethics in 1908.10 These rules
remained in effect for over sixty years. In the late 1960's, the
ABA drafted the Model Code of Professional Responsibility (Model
Code) and, more recently, the Model Rules of ProfessionalConduct
(Model Rules)." The purpose of the Model Code and the
Model Rules is to protect the public, to preserve the integrity
of the legal profession, and to preserve public confidence in
6.
Lawyer
7.
8.
9.
10.

Drake D. Hill, Balancing the Interests of Lawyers and Non-Lawyers in Regulating
Conduct, 43 RUTGERS L. REV. 245, 249 (1991).
This public distrust was due, in part, to extravagant legal fees. Id.
Id. at 250.
Id.
AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION CANON OF ETHICS, reprinted in HENRY S. DRINKER,
LEGAL ETHICS 309 app. (1953); see also Francis C. Cady, Canons to the Code of Professional
Responsibility, 2 CONN. L. REV. 222 (1969) (discussing the weaknesses of the Canons of

Professional Ethics).
11.

MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY

(1981);

MODEL RULES OF PRO-

(1983). The Model Code has been adopted, in some form, by
every state except California. In 1983, the ABA adopted the Model Rules of Professional Conduct. Presently, more than thirty states have adopted the Model Rules.
See CHARLES W. WOLFRAM, MODERN LEGAL ETHICS § 2.6.4 (1986).
FESSIONAL CONDUCT
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the profession. 12 Most jurisdictions have adopted either 3the
Model Code, the Model Rules, or some variation thereof.'
12. See e.g., Exparte Wall, 107 U.S. 265, 307 (1883); see also People v. Morley, 725
P.2d 510, 514 (Colo. 1986); In re Draper, 317 A.2d 106, 108 (Del. 1974); Tingle v.
Arnold, 199 S.E.2d 260, 263 (Ga. Ct. App. 1973); In reJensen, 418 N.W.2d 721, 722
(Minn. 1988); In re Kraemer, 361 N.W.2d 402, 404-05 (Minn. 1985); In re Kirtz, 494
S.W.2d 324, 326 (Mo. 1973); In re MacLeod, 479 S.W.2d 443, 445 (Mo. 1972), cert.
denied, 509 U.S. 979 (1972).
When determining penalties in legal disciplinary proceedings, courts have stated
that the critical factor influencing their decision is public protection, rather than attorney punishment. See, e.g., In re Rivkind, 791 P.2d 1037, 1040 (Ariz. 1990); Young
v. State Bar, 791 P.2d 994, 1000 (Cal. 1990); People v. Grenemyer, 745 P.2d 1027,
1029 (Colo. 1987); In re Christie, 574 A.2d 845, 851 (Del. 1990); In re Williams, 513
A.2d 793, 796 (D.C. 1986); DeBock v. State, 512 So.2d 164, 166 (Fla. 1987), cert.
denied, 484 U.S. 1025 (1988); In re Topper, 553 N.E.2d 306, 314 (Ill. 1990); Committee on Professional Ethics & Conduct v. Baudino, 452 N.W.2d 455, 459 (Iowa 1990);
Louisiana State Bar Ass'n v. Lindsay, 553 So.2d 807, 813 (La. 1989); In re Peters, 474
N.W.2d 164, 168 (Minn. 1991); In re Staab, 785 S.W.2d 551, 554 (Mo. 1990) (en
banc); State ex rel. Nebraska State Bar Ass'n v. Rhodes, 453 N.W.2d 73, 91 (Neb.

1990), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 153 (1990); In re Yaccarino, 564 A.2d 1184, 1195 (N.J.
1989); In re Ellis, 439 N.W.2d 808, 810-11 (N.D. 1989); In re Maragos, 285 N.W.2d
541, 545 (N.D. 1979); State ex rel. Oklahoma Bar Ass'n v. Colston, 777 P.2d 920, 925
(Okla. 1989); In re Gortmaker, 782 P.2d 421, 424 (Or. 1989); In re Weinstein, 459
P.2d 548, 549 (Or. 1969), cert. denied, 398 U.S. 903 (1970); Office of Disciplinary
Counsel v. Stern, 526 A.2d 1180, 1185-86 (Pa. 1987); Carter v. Ross, 461 A.2d 675,
676 (R.I. 1983); In re Kennedy, 176 S.E.2d 125, 126 (S.C. 1970); State v. Jennings,
159 S.E. 627, 628 (S.C. 1931); Zimmerman v. Board of Prof. Responsibility, 764
S.W.2d 757, 761 (Tenn. 1989), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1107 (1989); In re McGough, 793
P.2d 430, 438 (Wash. 1990); Committee on Legal Ethics v. Tatterson, 352 S.E.2d
107, 115 (W. Va. 1986); In re Rabideau, 306 N.W.2d 1, 17 (Wis. 1981), appeal dismissed, 454 U.S. 1025 (1981).
The Minnesota Supreme Court has repeatedly held that the primary purpose of
disciplinary proceedings is to protect the public. See In re Lochow, 469 N.W.2d 91, 96

(Minn. 1991); In re Ladd, 463 N.W.2d 281, 284 (Minn. 1990); In re Walker, 461
N.W.2d 219, 222 (Minn. 1990); In re Levenstein, 438 N.W.2d 665, 668 (Minn. 1989);
In re Schaefer, 423 N.W.2d 680, 683 (Minn. 1988); In reJensen, 418 N.W.2d 721, 722
(Minn. 1988); In re N.P., 361 N.W.2d 386, 393 (Minn. 1985), appeal dismissed, 474 U.S.

976 (1985); In re Peters, 332 N.W.2d 10, 16 (Minn. 1983); In re Olkon, 324 N.W.2d
192, 196 (Minn. 1982); In re Serstock, 316 N.W.2d 559, 561 (Minn. 1982); In re Peterson, 274 N.W.2d 922, 925 (Minn. 1979); In re Hanson, 258 Minn. 231, 233, 103
N.W.2d 863, 864 (Minn. 1960).
13. ALABAMA RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT (1992); ALASKA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY (1992); ARIZONA RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT (1992);
ARKANSAS MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT (1992); CALIFORNIA RULES OF
PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT (1992); COLORADO RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT (1992);
CONNECTICUT RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT (1992); DELAWARE LAWYERS' RULES
OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT (1992); FLORIDA RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT
(1992); GEORGIA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY (1992); HAWAII CODE OF
PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY (1992); IDAHO RIGHTS AND DUTIES OF ATrORNEYS
(1992); ILLINOIS RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT (1992); INDIANA RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT (1992); IOWA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY FOR LAWYERS
(1992); KANSAS MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT (1992); KENTUCKY RULES
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The Model Code consists of three "separate but interrelated" sections: Canons, Ethical Considerations, and Disciplinary Rules. 4 The Canons are statements of axiomatic norms
and express the general standards of professional conduct expected of lawyers in their relationship with the public, the legal
system, and the legal profession. The Ethical Considerations
and the Disciplinary Rules are derived from the Canons.' 5 The
Ethical Considerations constitute a body of principles upon
which a lawyer can rely for guidance in many fact-specific situations.1 6 They are aspirational in nature and represent the
objectives that every member of the profession should strive to
achieve.
If the Ethical Considerations represent the ceiling of professional conduct, the Disciplinary Rules represent the floor. The
Disciplinary Rules are mandatory rules and state the minimum
OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT

(1992);

(1992);

LOUISIANA RULES

MAINE CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY

PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT

(1992);

MASSACHUSETTS

OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT

(1992);

RULES

MARYLAND RULES OF

OF THE SUPREME JUDICIAL

COURT, ETHICAL REQUIREMENTS

(1992);

AND RULES CONCERNING THE PRACTICE OF LAW
MICHIGAN RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT (1992); MINNESOTA RULES OF

PROFESSIONAL

CONDUCT

(1992);

MississipPi

RULES

OF

PROFESSIONAL

CONDUCT

(1992);

MISSOURI RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT (1992); MONTANA RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT (1992); NEBRASKA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY

(1992);

NEVADA RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT

(1992); NEW

HAMPSHIRE RULES OF

PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT (1992); NEW JERSEY RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT
(1992); NEW MEXICO RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT (1992); NEW YORK CODE OF
PROFESSIONAL
CONDUCT

(1992);

RESPONSIBILITY

(1992);

CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY

CONDUCT

(1992);

NORTH

CAROLINA

(1992);

(1991-92);

(1992);

CONDUCT

(1992);

SOUTH DAKOTA RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT

OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY

(1992);

(1992);

SPONSIBILITY

(1992);

RULES

OF

TEXAS DISCIPLINARY

(1992);

SIONAL CONDUCT FOR ATTORNEYS
FOR ATTORNEYS AT LAW

(1992);

PENN-

CONDUCT

TENNESSEE CODE

RULES OF PROFES-

(1992);

VERMONT

VIRGINIA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RE-

WASHINGTON RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT

VIRGINIA RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT

(1992);

PROFESSIONAL

(1992);

UTAH RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT

CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY

OHIO

RHODE ISLAND RULES OF PROFES-

SIONAL

SOUTH CAROLINA

(1992);

OKLAHOMA RULES OF PROFESSIONAL

OREGON CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY

SYLVANIA RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT

SIONAL CONDUCT

RULES OF PROFESSIONAL

NORTH DAKOTA RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT

(1992);

(1992);

WEST

WISCONSIN RULES OF PROFES-

WYOMING RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT

(1992).

14. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY preliminary statement (1981).
15. Id.
16. Id. An ABA report noted that
Under the conditions of modern practice it is peculiarly necessary that the
lawyer should understand, not merely the established standards of professional conduct, but the reasons underlying these standards. Today the lawyer plays a changing and increasingly varied role. In many developing fields
the precise contribution of the legal profession is as yet undefined.
Professional Responsibility: Report of theJoint Conference, 44 A.B.A. J. 1159 (1958).
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level of acceptable conduct. If a lawyer does not perform at
this minimum level, the lawyer may be subject to disciplinary
action. 17

The Model Rules consist of fifty-four rules, supplemented by
explanatory comments.' While some of the rules are permissive in nature, others impose obligations, prohibitions, or "define the nature of the lawyer's relationships between the lawyer
and others."' 9
B.

Disciplinefor ExtraprofessionalMisconduct

Discipline for misconduct committed outside an attorney's
professional role has always been problematic for the legal
profession. Both the Model Code and the Model Rules contain regulations that define misconduct for lawyers.20
Although the rules specifically regulate conduct in the courtroom 2 or in the attorney's professional capacity, 22 the general

wording of the rules impliedly allow 2 3discipline for conduct
wholly unrelated to a lawyer's practice. Many states have ra17. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY preliminary statement (1990).

18. The comments are included purely as guidance and carry no authoritative
weight. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY pmbl. (1990).
19. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY pmbl. (1990).

20. Whether a particular state operates under a version of the Model Code or the

Model Rules, either typically includes a general misconduct rule. Compare MINNESOTA
RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 8.4 (1992) with MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 1-102 (1990).
21. See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY Rule 3.5(c) (1983)
(prohibiting an attorney from engaging in conduct intended to disrupt a tribunal).
22. See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY Rule 7.1 (1983) (prohibit-

ing a lawyer from making false or misleading statements about the lawyer or the
lawyer's services).
23. See MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 1-102(A)(4)
(198 l)(stating a lawyer shall not engage in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation). Numerous cases have held that regulation of conduct
unrelated to professional conduct is permissible. See William H. Raley Co. v. Superior Court, 197 Cal. Rptr. 232 (Cal. Ct. App. 1983) (stating professional responsibilities are relevant beyond a member of the bar's role as a lawyer); Committee on Prof.
Ethics and Conduct v. Millen, 357 N.W.2d 313 (Iowa 1984) (stating that lawyers'
professional responsibility applies to actions taken in their personal lives. Thus, discipline is appropriate even where the misconduct does not involve professional activities); Louisiana State Bar Ass'n v. Frank, 472 So.2d I (La. 1985) (holding that
disbarment may be appropriate discipline after conviction of violation of a law, even
if the violation is not related to the practice of law); State ex rel. Nebraska State Bar
Ass'n v. Hahn, 356 N.W.2d 885 (Neb. 1984) (noting that license to practice law is
granted on implied understanding that the party receiving it shall act in a proper
manner and avoid practices that will discredit the profession and the courts); but see In
re Peters, 428 N.W.2d 375, 382 (Minn. 1988) (Popovich, J., concurring specially)

Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 1993

7

William Mitchell
Law Review, Vol. 19, Iss. 1 [1993], Art. 5
WILLIAM
MITCHELL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 19

tionalized imposing discipline for extraprofessional misconduct because a lawyer should be held to a higher standard of
conduct than the average citizen, in light of his or her privileged role in society. 24 Moreover, some behavior may be so
egregious as to reflect negatively on the entire legal
profession.2 5
Various types of behavior have been sanctioned as misconduct by virtue of a person's status as a lawyer.26 Under the
Model Code, a lawyer is subject to discipline for criminal conduct involving "moral turpitude. '2 7 In contrast, under the
Model Rules, a lawyer is subject to discipline for criminal conduct that reflects "adversely on the lawyer's honesty, trustworthiness or fitness as a lawyer in other respects.' '28
"Moral turpitude" has been broadly defined as "an act of
baseness, vileness or depravity in the private and social duties
which a man owes to his fellow men, or to society in general,
contrary to the accepted and customary rule of right and duty
between man and man."' 29 One problem with the "moral tur-

pitude" criterion is ambiguity. This ambiguity invites differing
and competing interpretations 30 and leads to conclusory judi(commenting that professional discipline outside the attorney-client relationship
raises a host of ambiguities when the misconduct involved is noncriminal sexual
misconduct).
24. The organized bar has continually portrayed attorneys as moral guardians.
See Deborah L. Rhode, Moral Characteras a ProfessionalCredential, 94 YALE L.J. 491, 510
(1985). According to Justice Frankfurter, lawyers stood
"as a shield" . . . in defense of right and to ward off wrong. From a profession charged with such responsibilities there must be exacted those qualities
of truth-speaking, of a high sense of honor, of granite discretion, of the
strictest observance of fiduciary responsibility, that have, throughout the
centuries, been compendiously described as "moral character."
Id. at 508 (citing Schware v. Board of Bar Examiners, 353 U.S. 232, 247 (1957)
(Frankfurter, J., concurring).
25. See Kentucky Bar Ass'n v. Jones, 759 S.W.2d 61, 63 (Ky. 1988); State Bar v.
Claiborne, 756 P.2d 464, 526 (Nev. 1988) (citing In re Cochrane, 549 P.2d 328 (Nev.
1976)); Committee on Legal Ethics v. Roark, 382 S.E.2d 313, 318 (W. Va. 1989).
26. See, e.g., People v. Turner, 746 P.2d 49 (Colo. 1987) (suspending attorney for
one year for misrepresentations made in an effort to clear own speeding ticket and
obstruction of disciplinary investigation); Florida Bar v. Levin, 570 So.2d 917 (Fla.
1990) (publicly reprimanding attorney for illegal gambling and publicly advocating
the same on television), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 2888 (1991).
27. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT DR 1-102(A)(3)(1981).
28. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY Rule 8.4(b) (1991).
29. Attorney Grievance Comm'n v. Walman, 374 A.2d 354, 358 (Md. 1977)
(quoting Braverman v. Bar Ass'n, 121 A.2d 473, 481 (Md. 1956), cert. denied, 352 U.S.
830 (1956)). See also Jordan v. DeGeorge, 341 U.S. 223, 234 n.7 (1951).
30. Several commentators have criticized the moral turpitude standard as invit-
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cial analysis.3'
In contrast, the Model Rules eliminate the moral turpitude
standard and limit the extraprofessional conduct subjecting a
lawyer to professional discipline to criminal conduct that reflects "adversely on the lawyer's honesty, trustworthiness or
fitness as a lawyer in other respects.''82 Thus, under the Model
are disRules, the scope of criminal conduct for which lawyers
3
ciplined is narrower than under the Model Code. 3
ing subjective judgments of diverse lifestyles instead of measuring a lawyer's fitness
and ability to practice law. See, e.g., Donald T. Weckstein, Maintainingthe Integrity and
Competence of the Legal Profession, 48 TEX. L. REV. 267, 277 (1970);Jack Hartman, Comment, 1972 Pennsylvania Supreme Court Rules of DisciplinaryEnforcement: Relieving the Uncertainties of Marginal Attorney Crimes, 79 DICK. L. REV. 588, 597 (1975).

In Jordan v. DeGeorge, 341 U.S. 223 (1951), the Supreme Court discussed the
'moral turpitude" standard in an unrelated context. In Jordan, an immigrant was
threatened with deportation under the Immigration Act for engaging in a "crime
involving moral turpitude." Id. at 224-25. The government argued that the conduct
must be "measured against the moral standards that prevail in contemporary society
to determine whether [the conduct is] . . . immoral." Id. at 237. In dissent, Justice
Jackson argued that a standard that allowed legal decisions to "rest . . . upon the
moral reactions of particular judges to particular offenses" was not "government by
law." Id. at 239- 40 (Jackson, J., dissenting). Justice Jackson further argued:
If we go to the dictionaries, the last resort of the baffled judge, we learn little
except that the expression is redundant, for turpitude alone means moral
wickedness or depravity and moral turpitude seems to mean little more than
morally immoral.
Id. at 234 (citations omitted).
31. For example, the California Supreme Court held that "[t]o hold that an act of
a practitioner constitutes moral turpitude is to characterize him as unsuitable to practice law." See Rhode, supra note 24, at 552 (quoting In re Higbie, 493 P.2d 97, 101-02
(Cal. 1972). See also Comment, Discipline of Attorneys in Maryland, 35 MD. L. REV. 236,

259-60 (1975).
A number of commentators, critical of the Model Code's moral turpitude standard, have argued for a narrower and less ambiguous standard that is more closely
related to a lawyer's fitness to practice law. See, e.g., Robert C. Howard, Jr., Comment, DiscipliningAttorneys for Non-Professional Conduct Involving Alcohol and Sex, 1975
ARIz. ST. L.J. 411, 431.
32. See MODEL RvLES OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY Rule 8.4(b) (1983). The

comments to Model Rule 8.4 indicate that the moral turpitude provision was deleted
so that discipline is mandated only for misconduct that demonstrates a "lack of those
characteristics relevant to law practice." Id. at cmt. Courts have held a broad range
of criminal conduct affects a lawyer's fitness as a lawyer. See, e.g., In re Yussmann, 487
N.E.2d 161 (Ind. 1986) (holding attorney's conduct of depositing and using client
funds, which were intended as retainer, was contrary to employment agreement and
professional guidelines and, therefore, adversely reflected on fitness to practice law);
Florida Bar v. Lancaster, 448 So.2d 1019 (Fla. 1984) (stating that alteration of boat
identification numbers adversely reflected on lawyer's fitness to practice); Cincinnati
Bar Ass'n v. Heekin, 459 N.E.2d 495 (Ohio 1984) (noting that theft of utility services
reflects adversely on lawyer's fitness to practice).
33. The Minnesota Supreme Court adopted the Minnesota Rules of Professional
Conduct in September 1985. They are patterned substantially after the ABA Model
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While a criminal conviction for certain offenses committed
outside of an attorney's professional role may result in disbarment, 4 not all criminal conduct results in such a severe sanction. Most jurisdictions require that the conduct underlying
the criminal conviction involve "moral turpitude" or "reflect
adversely on the lawyer's fitness as a lawyer" before sanctions
will be imposed.3 5 However, such standards tend to be ambiguous.

6

As a result, similar factual patterns may generate dis-

parate responses within and across jurisdictions.
Convictions for tax evasion and sexual misconduct committed outside of an attorney's professional role frequently result
in attorney discipline and illustrate the inconsistencies in applying the "moral turpitude" or "fitness as a lawyer" standards. State courts disagree whether deliberate evasion of
taxes or failure to file a tax return reflects adversely on a lawyer's fitness as a lawyer.3 7 In Minnesota, no attorney has ever
been disbarred where the only misconduct involved was a violation of personal income tax law filing requirements. 3 ' However, attorneys have been disciplined for noncompliance with
filing requirements when the evidence shows the attorney acted to avoid or to delay
paying taxes, especially if other mis3 9
conduct is involved.
Rules and, thus, include its narrower standard for misconduct. See In re Weiblen, 439
N.W.2d 7, 9 n.2 (Minn. 1989).
34. See Rhode, supra note 24, at 551 (citing Kentucky Bar Ass'n v. Pope, 549
S.W.2d 296, 297 (Ky. 1976) (noting that disbarment was warranted upon conviction
for felonies relating to tax evasion)); CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE §§ 6101, 6102 (West
1990) (requiring suspension and disbarment upon conviction of crimes involving
moral turpitude); N.Y. JUDICIARY LAw § 90(4) (McKinney 1983) (requiring disbarment upon conviction of all felonies).
35. See, e.g., MODEL CODE DR 1-102(3) (stating that a lawyer shall not engage in
illegal conduct involving moral turpitude); MODEL RULES Rule 8.4(b) (stating that it
is misconduct to commit criminal acts that reflect adversely on a lawyer's fitness as a
lawyer).
36. In Konigsberg v. State Bar, 353 U.S. 252, 263 (1957), the United States
Supreme Court made a similar observation regarding character. The Court noted
that "definition[s] [used to clarify this standard] will necessarily reflect the attitudes,
experiences, and prejudices of the definer." Id. Accordingly, the standard can be
used as a "dangerous instrument for arbitrary and discriminatory denial of the right
to practice law." Id.
37. See Rhode, supra note 24, at 552.
38. In re Wylde, 454 N.W.2d 423, 425 (Minn. 1990).
39. Id. Cases resulting in long term suspension involve numerous or willful violations of tax laws without substantial mitigating circumstances. Id. at 426. See In re
Chrysler, 434 N.W.2d 668, 670 (Minn. 1989) (suspending a lawyer convicted twice of
tax evasion for failing to file a return for fifteen years), reinstatement ordered, 447
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Criminal convictions arising out of sexual misconduct have
consistently been an area of concern for the bar when assessing an individual's moral character. Judicial decisions generally reflect the sexual mores of the era in which a case was
decided.40 Yet, modern cases still reflect divergent views.
Convictions for child molestation, adultery, or homosexual

acts 4 1 may result in different sanctions, depending on the juris-

diction or the relationship of the acts to the practice of law.
These examples illustrate that disciplinary proceedings for
extraprofessional conduct can be highly subjective. Without
any meaningful precepts, disciplinary panels and courts may
merely air their own subjective inclinations in judging the conduct at issue.
C. JudicialApplication of the Fitness to Practice Standard
One of the few cases to offer a cogent analysis of the "fitness
to practice" standard in the context of nonprofessional conduct is the Washington decision of In re Curran.42 In Curran, an
attorney was convicted of vehicular homicide.4" The attorney
became intoxicated at a luncheon with a group of clients and,
while driving them home, he drove off the road, killing two
clients. 44 The state bar charged that Curran's conduct "reflect[ed] adversely on his fitness as a lawyer." '4 5 Relying for
guidance upon an Indiana decision,4 6 the Washington
Supreme Court focused on the nexus between the misconduct
N.W.2d 877 (Minn. 1989); In re Sax, 321 N.W.2d 902, 903 (Minn. 1982) (suspending
a lawyer indefinitely for failure to file a tax return for six years); In re Frisbee, 262
N.W.2d 162 (Minn. 1977) (holding willful and knowing failure to file tax return for
four years warranted a one year suspension).
40. See Id. at 553 (citing In re Wallace, 19 S.W.2d 625, 625 (Mo. 1929). Wallace
was convicted of the crime of "seduction under promise to marry" and sentenced to
prison. Wallace, 19 S.W.2d at 625. This conduct constituted "baseness and depravity" and justified disbarment. Id. Compare In re Isserman, 6 NJ. Misc. 146, 140 A.
253, 253 (1928) (suspending lawyer for six months for having sexual intercourse with
a sixteen-year-old).
41. Compare Florida Bar v. Kay, 232 So.2d 378, 379 (Fla. 1970) (revoking attorney's license for indecent exposure in a public lavatory), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 956
(1970) with Florida Board of Bar Examiners Re N.R.S., 403 So.2d 1315 (1981) (holding that "[p]rivate noncommercial sexual acts between consenting adults are not relevant to prove fitness to practice law.")
42. 801 P.2d 962 (Wash. 1990).
43. Id. at 963.
44. Id.

45. Id. at 964.
46. In re Oliver, 493 N.E.2d 1237 (Ind. 1986).
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and the lawyer's fitness to practice law. 47 The court noted that
the purpose of the fitness to practice rule was to "assure the
public that attorneys provide legal services responsibly and
competently."

48

The court concluded that "conduct reflecting adversely on a
lawyer's fitness to practice law can only be found when there is
some nexus between the lawyer's conduct and those characteristics relevant to law practice."' 49 The court went on to state
that the fitness to practice rule is not concerned with maintaining public confidence in the bar, rather, the rule's policy is to
protect the public from incompetent practitioners.50
In contrast, the Minnesota Supreme Court has expressed a
willingness to apply professional disciplinary rules to extraprofessional conduct that is seemingly unrelated to an attorney's ability to practice law." For example, in In re Miera,52 the
Minnesota Supreme Court sanctioned and reprimanded a
judge for sexual harassment. The court issued an admonition
to Miera in his capacity as a lawyer stating that "[w]hether or
not his conduct technically constitutes sexual harassment
under.

. [the Minnesota Human Rights Act], it shows at least

47. In re Curran, 801 P.2d 962, 971 (Wash. 1990).
48. Id. at 970-71 (quoting In re Oliver, 493 N.E.2d 1237, 1242 (Ind. 1986)). See
also In re Krogh, 536 P.2d 578 (Wash. 1975).
49. Curran, 801 P.2d at 972. But see Nat'l Rptr. on Legal Ethics, D.C. Formal op.
222, at 23 (1992) (dissenting opinion). A number of commentators have noted that
discrimination outside the practice of law does not necessarily have a detrimental
impact on a practitioner's fitness. For example, in response to an inquiry into
whether a lawyer's refusal to hire homosexuals reflected adversely on his fitness, a
District of Columbia Ethics Committee member noted:
The inquirer is a lawyer licensed in the District of Columbia but not in
any other jurisdiction. He is an elder in several religious organizations presumably participating in employment decisions. The religious organizations
as a matter of conviction restrict employment based on sexual orientation.
There is no color of legal practice in the lawyer's participation in these organizations, and there is no basis for believing that his participation colors his
legal practice in the District of Columbia. We may assume that his participation in them reflects personal beliefs and, hypothetically, that these beliefs
may affect the way he conducts his practice. However, many lawyers have
deeply felt beliefs or convictions, religious or otherwise, which may influence their practice. Unless there is clear indication that conformance to
such a conviction has resulted in actions within his practice that violate the
Rules, we cannot say that he cannot practice law if he holds what may well
be contentious or even offensive convictions.
Id.

50. Curran, 801 P.2d at 972.
51. See, e.g., In re Peters, 428 N.W.2d 375, 381 (Minn. 1988); In re Miera, 426
N.W.2d 850, 856 (Minn. 1988); In re Kirby, 354 N.W.2d 410, 414 (Minn. 1984).
52. 426 N.W.2d 850 (Minn. 1988).
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indifference to his legal and ethical obligations. Such conduct
adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law, and a public
reprimand is warranted." 5 3
III.

DUE PROCESS CONCERNS OVER PROFESSIONAL DISCIPLINE

The United States Supreme Court has characterized attorney disciplinary proceedings as "adversary proceedings of a
quasi-criminal nature ' 4 and, accordingly, held that due process protections apply.5 5 The Court has long acknowledged
that pursuit of one's chosen profession is a rudimentary liberty
interest, accorded due process protection under the Fifth and
Fourteenth Amendments. 56 In Schware v. Board of Bar Examiners, 57 the Supreme Court held that "[a] State cannot exclude a
person from the practice of law or from any other occupation
in a manner or for reasons that contravene the Due Process...
58
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment."
Courts have held that an attorney's license to practice law is
not a "matter of grace and favor."' 59 Rather, it is a right that
cannot be revoked without satisfying the requirements of procedural due process. 60 Although states can impose certain requirements on persons who practice law, these requirements
must be rationally related to an attorney's fitness to practice
law.61
Since disbarment and, therefore, deprivation of one's cho53. Id. at 859.
54. In re Ruffalo, 390 U.S. 544, 551 (1968). See also Erdmann v. Stevens, 458 F.2d
1205, 1209-10 (2d Cir. 1972) (holding that attorney disciplinary proceedings are
quasi-criminal in nature because the proceedings may result in the loss of livelihood
and harm to the attorney's reputation), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 889 (1972).
55. Ruffalo, 390 U.S. at 550.
56. Id. (holding that due process requires fair notice of the charge against an
attorney); Willner v. Committee on Character and Fitness, 373 U.S. 96, 103 (1963)
(holding that due process requires confrontation and cross-examination of character
witnesses in an attorney disciplinary proceeding).
57. 353 U.S. 232 (1957).
58. Id. at 238-39 (citing Dent v. West Virginia, 129 U.S. 114, 121-22 (1889)). See
also Willner, 373 U.S. at 102; Exparte Secombe, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 9, 10 (1856).
59. Willner, 373 U.S. at 102 (quoting Exparte Garland, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 333, 379
(1866)).
60. Id. at 103.
61. Schware, 353 U.S. at 239. See also Douglas v. Noble, 261 U.S. 165, 168 (1923)
(holding that state statute regulating the practice of dentistry violates due process if
requirements have no relation to the capacity to practice dentistry); Cummings v.
Missouri, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 277, 319-20 (1866) (holding that oath requirement violates due process, because oath has no relation to capacity to preach and to teach).
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sen profession is a potential penalty for violation of a disciplinary rule, due process protections are particularly important.
Moreover, where a person's reputation is jeopardized through
governmental action, due process guarantees must be meticulously observed.62 Thus, the Minnesota Rules of Professional
Conduct must be sufficiently specific in their terms to satisfy
the due process requirements set forth in the void for vagueness doctrine.
The Void for Vagueness Doctrine
A statute is unconstitutionally vague and violates due process if (1) the statute does not provide a person of ordinary
intelligence with notice of conduct that is proscribed;" and (2)
the law impermissibly delegates legislative decisions to those
charged with enforcing the law "on an ad hoc and subjective
basis, with the attendant dangers of arbitrary and discriminatory application." ' As a result, where a rule lacks clear guidelines for enforcement, the danger of arbitrary or
discriminatory enforcement of the rule may violate due
65
process.

A.

62. Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 573 (1972) (quoting Wisconsin v.
Constantineau, 400 U.S. 433,437 (1971)); Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 722-23 (1976)
(Brennan, J., dissenting) ("[T]he enjoyment of one's good name and reputation has
been recognized repeatedly in our cases as being among the most cherished of rights
enjoyed by a free people, and therefore as falling within the concept of personal
'liberty.' ").

63. An unconstitutionally vague statute is one that requires a person of average
intelligence to guess as to its meaning or intended application. See, e.g., Connally v.
General Constr. Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391 (1926). This rule, originally applied to criminal statutes, has been extended to civil statutes as well. See Village of Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc., 455 U.S. 489, 497 (1982).
64. Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108-09 (1972); see also Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156, 162 (1972). In Papachristou, the Supreme
Court struck down a vagrancy statute on vagueness grounds. In doing so, the Court
found that the statute failed to provide adequate guidance for law enforcement
agents and thus gave the police "unfettered discretion" to arrest any person whose
lifestyle they disapproved of. Papachristou, 405 U.S. at 168.
65. See Smith v. Goguen, 415 U.S. 566, 575 (1974) (holding a Massachusetts statute that prohibited mutilation or contemptuous treatment of the flag void because it
allowed "policemen, prosecutors, and juries to pursue their personal predilections.").
A fundamental purpose of the Due Process Clause is to restrict state deviations
from the notion of "ordered liberty" and the ideal of a "government of laws, and not
men." See Rhode, supra note 24, at 572-73. By demanding precision in standards,
"the void-for-vagueness doctrine seeks to restrain erratic and capricious governmental oversight." Id. Furthermore, "[gliven the limitations and expense of ad hoc appellate review, legal mandates must be framed with sufficient precision to afford a
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B.

Vagueness Challenges to the Fitness to Practice Standard

Judicial treatment of the "fitness to practice" standard is
often circular and conclusory. Outcomes are inconsistent, and
often courts simply pronounce an assessment that the conduct
at issue renders the attorney unfit, and that the constitutional
challenge is without merit.6 6
1.

United States Supreme Court Treatment

The United States Supreme Court has repeatedly declined
to review state decisions upholding the "fitness to practice"
standard. 67 The Court has, however, reviewed state decisions
in which individuals were denied admission to the bar based on
68
a lack of "fitness."
For example, in 1971, the Supreme Court upheld a New
York "fitness" standard for bar admission that was challenged
on vagueness grounds. In Law Students Civil Rights Research
certain regularity in administration as well as the 'appearance of even-handed justice.' " Id. (quoting Mayberg v. Pennsylvania, 400 U.S. 455, 469 (1971) (Harlan, J.,
concurring)).
66. See, e.g., In re Holtzman, 577 N.E.2d 30, 33 (N.Y. 1991) (upholding the "fitness to practice" standard as constitutional), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 648 (1992); In re
Cohen, 530 N.Y.S.2d 830, 832 (N.Y. App. Div. 1988) (holding that the "fitness to
practice" standard is not unconstitutionally vague as applied to an experienced attorney who had notice that his conduct negatively affected his fitness to practice). See
also In re Keiler, 380 A.2d 119, 126 (D.C. 1977) (holding that constitutional challenge
to disciplinary rule was "wholly without merit"), overruled on other grounds by, In re
Hutchinson, 534 A.2d 919 (D.C. 1987); In re Sekerez, 458 N.E.2d 229, 236 (Ind.
1984) (holding that the fitness to practice standard could not be found unconstitutional where the argument was not substantiated by any authority), cert. denied, 469
U.S. 856 (1984); Committee on Professional Ethics & Conduct v. Durham, 279
N.W.2d 280, 284 (Iowa 1979) (stating that the fitness to practice standard was not so
vague as to violate due process); State v. Nelson, 504 P.2d 211, 214 (Kan. 1972)
(rejecting argument that "prejudicial" is unconstitutionally vague because "[i]t cannot be seriously contended that 'prejudicial' does not sufficiently define the degree of
conduct which is expected of an attorney"); In re N.P., 361 N.W.2d 386, 394 (Minn.
1985) (holding that the disciplinary rules "are sufficiently well defined to satisfy due
process"), appeal dismissed, 474 U.S. 976 (1985); In re Rook, 556 P.2d 1351, 1357 (Or.
1976) (stating that "we believe [the] standards of professional conduct ... are sufficiently definite for the purpose of a professional disciplinary proceeding"); Howell v.
State, 559 S.W.2d 432, 436 (Tex. Ct. App. 1977) (holding that DR I-102(A)(5) is not
unconstitutionally vague).
67. See, e.g., In re Graham, 453 N.W.2d 313, 319 (Minn. 1990), reinstatement ordered, 459 N.W.2d 706 (Minn. 1990), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 67 (1990); In re N.P., 361
N.W.2d 386, 394-95 (Minn. 1985).
68. See, e.g., Konigsberg v. State Bar, 353 U.S. 252 (1957); Schware v. Board of
Bar Examiners, 353 U.S. 232 (1957); Law Students Civil Rights Research Council,
Inc. v. Wadmond, 401 U.S. 154 (1971).
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Council, Inc. v. Wadmond,6 9 a group of law students challenged a
New York law that denied admission to the bar unless the applicant proved two things: first, the applicant believed in the
United States government, and second, the applicant was loyal
70
to the government.
The court noted that "[l]ong usage in New York and elsewhere had given well-defined contours to [the loyalty] requirement, which
[had been] construed narrowly as
encompassing no more than 'dishonorable conduct relevant to
71 Accordingly,
the legal profession.' ,,
the "fitness" standard
was held not to violate due process.
2.

State Court Treatment
a.

Colorado

In People v. Morley, 72 a Colorado lawyer, who allegedly counseled clients in illegal activities, unsuccessfully challenged the
"fitness to practice" standard on vagueness grounds. The Colorado Supreme Court noted that the fitness to practice rule is
specifically directed at attorneys rather than the public at
large. 73 Therefore, the standard to be applied was whether a
"licensed lawyer" was able to comprehend the nature of the
conduct proscribed by the rule. 4
The court found that the disciplinary rules were adequate to
inform lawyers of the nature of the conduct proscribed.7 5
Moreover, the rule provided "sufficiently clear norms of conduct for the objective administration of the disciplinary process." 76 The court concluded that "[i]t requires little
imagination to conclude that any practicing attorney would
know that counseling illegal activity . . .reflects adversely on
' 77
that lawyer's fitness to practice law."
b.

New York

New York's highest court recently rejected a constitutional
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.

401 U.S. 154 (1971).
Id.
Id. at 159.
725 P.2d 510 (Colo. 1986).
Id. at 516.
Id.

75. Id.
76. Id. at 517.
77. People v. Morley, 725 P.2d 510, 516 (Colo. 1986).
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challenge of the "fitness to practice" standard. In In re Holtzman, 78 a district attorney publicly released allegations of judicial misconduct that were later found to be unsupported by the
evidence. 9
The Grievance Committee for the Tenth Judicial District of
New York issued a letter of reprimand to the attorney, stating
that she had engaged in conduct that adversely reflected on
her fitness to practice law.8 0 In rejecting the attorney's vagueness challenge, the New York Court of Appeals articulated
three reasons why the "fitness" standard was not unconstitutionally vague. First, the court noted that the United States
Supreme Court has acknowledged that "it is difficult, if not impossible, to enumerate and define, with legal precision, every
offense for which an attorney or counsellor ought to be removed."'" Second, the court stated that if they were to hold
the "fitness to practice" standard unconstitutionally vague, any
attempts to promulgate general behavioral guidelines would
be futile.8 2 Third, the court noted that the proper standard to
be applied was whether a reasonable attorney, familiar with the
professional rules and its ethical strictures, would have notice
of what conduct is proscribed. 3 Applying this standard, the
court believed that the attorney "was plainly on notice that her
conduct in this case ...

could be held to reflect adversely on

78. 577 N.E.2d 30 (N.Y. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 649 (1991).
79. Id. at 32.
80. Id.

81. Id. at 33 (citing Exparte Secombe, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 9, 14 (1856)).
82. In re Holtzman, 577 N.E.2d 30, 33 (N.Y. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 649
(1991).
83. Id. The "reasonable attorney" standard has been used by several other jurisdictions. See, e.g., Committee on Professional Ethics & Conduct v. Durham, 279
N.W.2d 280, 283-84 (Iowa 1979). While due process protections apply, several
courts have utilized a vagueness standard that is less stringent than that applied to
criminal statutes. These courts have simply adjusted the standard to account for the
knowledge of the persons subject to the regulation. See id. at 283 (citing In re Rook,
556 P.2d 1356, 1357 (Or. 1976); In re Keiler, 380 A.2d 119, 126 (D.C. 1977), overruled
on other grounds by, In re Hutchinson, 534 A.2d 919 (D.C. 1987)).

In Durham, the court justified a lower standard of due process scrutiny because
"the Code of Professional Responsibility was written for lawyers by lawyers" and
"guidelines setting standards for members of the bar need not and cannot meet the
standard of clarity required of rules of conduct for laymen due to the training and
specialized nature of the body being regulated." Durham, 279 N.W.2d at 284. However, the United States Supreme Court has affirmed that lawyers are entitled to some
of the same constitutional protections as laymen. See Spevack v. Klein, 385 U.S. 511,
516 (1967).
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her fitness to practice law." 84
c.

Iowa

In Committee on Professional Ethics & Conduct v. Durham, 5 an
attorney was disciplined for having sexual contact with a client,
who was incarcerated in the state penitentiary.8 6 The Iowa
Supreme Court held that the attorney's conduct reflected adversely on her fitness as a lawyer.8 7 In dismissing the vagueness challenge, the court held that the standard for
determining whether a provision of the Code of Professional
Responsibility is unconstitutionally vague is whether a reasonable attorney would understand what conduct was prohibited.8 8 The court found that a reasonable attorney would
understand that sexual contact with an incarcerated client,
which occurred while the attorney was acting in a professional
capacity, was prohibited behavior.8 9
d.

Minnesota

The Minnesota Supreme Court has only considered the constitutionality of the "fitness to practice" standard on one occasion. In In re N.P., 90 the director of the Professional
Responsibility Board issued a number of charges against an attorney as a result of the attorney's activities in soliciting and
representing clients involved in the Dalkon Shield litigation. 9 '
These charges alleged the wrongful solicitation of claims and
payment of referral fees, altering law firm records in an effort
to subvert the disciplinary investigation, receipt of confidential
information which enhanced his client's position, subverting
the adversary system, breach of fiduciary duty, and failure to
obtain his client's consent to settlements.92
Relying on broad principles of statutory construction, the
Minnesota Supreme Court noted that, although the subjects of
84. Holtzman, 577 N.E.2d at 33.
85. 279 N.W.2d 280 (Iowa 1979).
86. Id. at 285.

87. Id.
88. Id. at 284.

89. Id. at 285-86.
90. 361 N.W.2d 386 (Minn. 1985), appeal dismissed, 474 U.S. 976 (1985).
91. Id. at 391-92.
92. Id.
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disciplinary proceedings are entitled to due process,9 3 "difficulty in construction is not in itself sufficient to set aside a rule,
and the [disciplinary] rule 'should be upheld unless the terms
are so uncertain and indefinite that after exhausting all rules of
construction it is impossible to ascertain legislative intent.' ""
In support of its analysis, the court noted that "[t]he United
States Supreme Court recognized long ago that 'it is difficult, if
not impossible, to enumerate and define, with legal precision,
every offense for which an attorney

. .

. ought to be re-

moved.' "- In addition, the court stated that the "fitness to
practice" standard does "no more than reflect the fundamental
principle of professional responsibility that an attorney, as an
officer of the court, has i duty to deal fairly with the court and
the client."' 9 6 The court also concluded that when "[r]ead in

conjunction with other disciplinary rules," the "fitness to practice" standard is "sufficiently well defined to satisfy due process."-9 7 Thus, the fitness standard was upheld.

IV.

THE DEVELOPMENT OF RULE 8.4(h)

The impetus for Rule 8.4(h) was the Minnesota Supreme
Court Task Force for Gender Fairness in the Courts (Minnesota Report)." The Minnesota Supreme Court established the
93. Id. at 394.
94. Id. at 394 (quoting Anderson v. Burnquist, 216 Minn. 49, 53, 11 N.W.2d 776,
778 (1943)). Note that the Anderson court applied this language to a statute, while the
court in In re N.P. applied this language to the rules of professional conduct.
95. In re N.P. at 395 (quoting Exparte Secombe, 60 U.S. (1 How.) 9, 14 (1856).
96. In re N.P. at 395.
97. Id.

98. MINNESOTA SUPREME COURT TASK FORCE FOR GENDERFAIRNESS IN THE
COURTS, FINAL REPORT [hereinafter Minnesota Report] reprinted in 15 WM. MITCHELL
L. REV. 825, 933 (1989) (recommending that standards of gender fair behavior for all
participants in the judicial system should be incorporated into the Rules of Professional Conduct).
By 1991, more than thirty-three states had discrimination task forces of some
form. Update: Gender Bias in the Courts, TRIAL, July 1991, at 112. Sixteen of these
states had issued published reports, including California, Colorado, Florida, Illinois,
Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Nevada, New Jersey, New York,
Rhode Island, Utah, Vermont, Wisconsin, and Washington. See GENDER &JUSTICE IN
THE COLORADO COURTS, REPORT OF THE COLORADO SUPREME COURT TASK FORCE ON

GENDER BIAS IN THE COURTS (1990) (cited in Katherine Tamblyn, Changing Old Patterns: The Gender Bias, 20 COLO. LAW. 1091 (1991)); REPORT OF THE FLORIDA SUPREME
COURT GENDER BIAS STUDY COMMISSION, reprinted in 42 FLA. L. REV. 803 (1990);
MARYLAND SPECIAL JOINT COMMITrEE ON GENDER BIAS IN THE COURTS, reprinted in 20
U. BALT. L. REV. (1990); FINAL REPORT OF THE MICHIGAN SUPREME COURT TASK
FORCE ON GENDER ISSUES IN THE COURTS (1989) (excerpted in 23 U. MIcH.J.L. REF.
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Task Force in June 1987. 9 9 Its charter was to explore the pervasiveness of gender bias in the Minnesota state court system,
to classify and record bias where found, and to suggest procedures to eradicate bias.' 0 0
The Task Force focused on three areas of discrimination:
gender-based employment discrimination,' 0 ' sexual harassment of attorneys in the court system,' 0 2 and harassment of
female litigants and witnesses in the court system.10 3 The Task
Force recommended that the state bar association increase its
pro bono efforts in attempting to ameliorate gender-based employment discrimination, attempt to increase attorney fee
awards in prosecuting such claims, and to double or triple
plaintiff's damage awards to encourage claimants to come
forward. 104
Based on its finding that participants in the courtroom were
subjected to disparate treatment based on gender, the Task
Force recommended that the Code of Judicial Conduct, the
Rules of Professional Conduct, and the Rules for Uniform De319, app. (1990));

NEVADA SUPREME COURT GENDER BIAS TASK FORCE, JUSTICE FOR

WOMEN (1989); THE FIRST YEAR REPORT OF THE NEW JERSEY SUPREME COURT TASK

FORCE ON WOMEN IN THE COURTS-JUNE, 1984, reprinted in 9 WOMEN'S RTS. L. REP.

129 (1986);
printed in

REPORT OF THE NEW YORK TASK FORCE ON WOMEN IN THE COURTS, re-

15 FORDHAM URB. L. J. 11 (1986-87)

[hereinafter NEW YORK REPORT];
WASHINGTON STATE TASK FORCE ON GENDER AND JUSTICE IN THE COURTS, GENDER

(1989).
For an overview of these task force findings, see Lynn Schafran, Gender andJustice:
Florida and the Nation, 42 FLA. L. REV. 181 (1990); Lynn Hecht Schafran, Overwhelming
Evidence: Reports on Gender Bias in the Courts, TRIAL, Feb. 1990, at 28.
99. MINNESOTA REPORT, supra note 98, at 835.
100. Id. The Task Force looked at "thousands of pages of documentation, preliminary findings, and committee reports." Id. at 840.
101. Id. at 917-22. The Task Force noted that gender-based employment discrimination is prohibited by the Minnesota Human Rights Act, which it concluded provides ample protection in this context. Id. at 917.
102. MINNESOTA REPORT, supra note 98, at 941-46. The Task Force found that a
"majority" of female attorneys are subjected to gender-based disparate treatment by
other attorneys in Minnesota courtrooms. Id.at 933. This disparate treatment included "different forms of address, demeaning comments, inquiries about professional identity and inappropriate comments about physical appearance." Id. Nearly
fifty percent of female lawyers have observed, confirmed, or have been subjected to
this type of behavior. Id. The Task Force further found that "[a] majority of women
report that when such behavior occurs, judges rarely or never intervene to stop it."
Id.
103. See MINNESOTA REPORT, supra note 98, at 23-34.
104. Id. at 921-22. The Task Force also recommended that the bar association
undertake an analysis to measure damage awards and other relief granted by various
administrative agencies and the courts. Id. at 921.
AND JUSTICE IN THE COURTS
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corum be amended to include standards for gender-fair behavior.' °5 The Task Force also recommended that law schools,
continuing legal education, and employee training programs
incorporate gender fairness issues into their curricula. 10 6
The Task Force concluded that sexual harassment was common in the legal profession finding that, although sexual harassment policies had been adopted throughout the court
system, sexual harassment continued to occur and often went
unremedied. 10 7 Accordingly, the Task Force recommended
that sexual harassment policies and procedures be developed
that would work effectively within the judicial system. 0 The
Task Force also recommended amending the Canons of Judicial Ethics to forbid sexual harassment.10 9
The subcommittee on discrimination initially convened to
determine whether the Rules of Professional Conduct should
be amended to prohibit discrimination in an attorney's professional capacity." 0 However, after reviewing the Task Force's
report, the subcommittee on discrimination recommended
105. Id. at 933.
106. Id.
107. Id. at 945. The Task Force also found that court personnel were more likely
to be subjected to sexual harassment than other participants in the judicial system.
Id. Furthermore, the existing internal grievance system was inadequate to protect
these employees, because court personnel perceived themselves to be more vulnerable to the power ofjudges. Id.
108. MINNESOTA REPORT, supra note 98, at 945-46.
109. Id. at 946. The Task Force noted that:
The present grievance system for sexual harassment complaints is inadequate in part because of the special vulnerability of court personnel, some of
whom are employees at will, and because of the perceived power ofjudges
which makes attorney victims fear negative consequences for themselves
and their clients if they pursue complaints.
Id. at 945.
110. See MINNESOTA STATE BAR ASSOCIATION RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT
COMMITTEE SUBCOMMITTEE ON DISCRIMINATION REPORT

(on file with

WILLIAM MITCH-

The report notes:
The Minnesota State Bar Association Ad Hoc Committee on Rule 8.4(b),
which recommended the amending of Rule 8.4 of the Minnesota Rules of
Professional Conduct to create a subsection g which prohibits harassing a
person while the lawyer is acting in a professional capacity, also recommended that the Minnesota State Bar Association establish and appoint an
ad hoc committee to consider and further study discrimination in the practice of law and to prepare recommendations to the Minnesota State Bar Association for possible additional amendments to the Minnesota Rules of
Professional Conduct regarding discrimination. Consequently, in December 1989, R. Walter Bachman, chairperson of the Rules of Professional Conduct Committee, established a Subcommittee on Discrimination to consider
the issues which had been referred to it by the Ad Hoc Committee on Rule
8.4(b).

ELL LAW REVIEW).
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that the charter of the Task Force be expanded to promulgate
a rule prohibiting unlawful discrimination by lawyers."'
In 1991, the subcommittee considered draft proposals of
various antidiscrimination provisions. The drafts ranged from
prohibiting discriminatory acts committed in a professional capacity, to prohibiting employment discrimination, to prohibiting all discriminatory acts. The subcommittee eventually
drafted a broad antidiscrimination provision. Rather than limiting the rule to the lawyer's conduct in the workplace or to
acts committed by a lawyer while acting in a professional capacity, the rule covered all acts by lawyers. In support of its
actions, the subcommittee declared that the new rule:
reflects the premise that the concept of human equality lies
at the very heart of our legal system. A lawyer whose behavior demonstrates hostility toward or indifference to the policy of equal justice under the law may thereby manifest a
lack of character required of members of the legal profession. Therefore, a lawyer's discriminatory act prohibited by
statute or ordinance may reflect adversely on his or her fitInitially, the Subcommittee was entitled the Discrimination in Employment Subcommittee. However, after reviewing the report of the Minnesota
Supreme Court Task Force for Gender Fairness in the Courts and the Minnesota State Bar Association Report of the Committee on Women in the
Legal Profession, the Subcommittee recommended to the Rules of Professional Conduct Committee that its name and purpose be expanded to incorporate discrimination in the legal profession rather than in employment
only. Accordingly the Subcommittee changed its name to the Discrimination Subcommittee, and considered whether a rule or rules was necessary to
address discrimination in the legal profession as a whole, rather than in employment only.
Id.
1 11.

See SUBCOMMITTEE ON DISCRIMINATION, MINNESOTA STATE BAR ASSOCIATION,
BOARD OF GOVERNORS MEETING 2.05a (1991).
The Minnesota Gender Bias Task Force had recommended that the Minnesota
Rules of Professional Conduct be amended, directing lawyers not to engage in discriminatory conduct within the judicial system. See MINNESOTA REPORT, supra note
98, at 933.
When the Task Force looked at the issue of gender-based employment discrimination in general, however, the Task Force noted that the Minnesota Human Rights
Act appeared to offer considerable protection against such discrimination. Id. at 917.
The Task Force also found that victims of gender discrimination have the option of
filing a civil action in state court or filing a charge with the Minnesota Department of
Human Rights or similar local agency within one year of the occurrence of the discriminatory conduct. Id. (citing MINN. STAT. § 363.06 (1)-(3) (1992).
The Task Force made no findings regarding the prevalence of attorney discrimination in the workplace, nor did it make any recommendations that the MINNESOTA
RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT be amended to proscribe any other discriminatory
act.
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ness as a lawyer even if the unlawful discriminatory act was
not committed in connection with the lawyer's professional
activities. 12
V.
A.

ANALYSIS

Vagueness Analysis of Rule 8.4(h)

Rule 8.4(h) violates due process because it is open to differing and subjective interpretations. Under both the "long usage" standard, employed by the United States Supreme Court
in Law Students Civil Rights Research Council v. Wadmond 1 3 and
the "reasonable attorney" standard employed in various jurisdictions," t 4 the language of Rule 8.4(h) is unconstitutionally
vague. Even when analyzed under the diminished due process
rationale used by the Minnesota Supreme Court in In re
N.P.,1 5 the language of the rule lacks the requisite specificity
and is therefore unconstitutionally vague.
Minnesota's Rule 8.4(h) is the only rule of its kind. No other
state seeks to regulate an attorney's extraprofessional conduct
in such a fashion." . 6 Since there has been no pattern of "long
usage" in regulating an attorney's conduct for discriminatory
acts committed outside an attorney's professional life, no welldefined contours exist to place attorneys on notice of the conduct that is proscribed.
Even when viewed in light of the diminished due process
analysis performed by the Minnesota Supreme Court in In re
N.P., the rule encounters several difficulties. In In re N.P., the
court stated that difficulty with construction of a rule is not, by
itself, sufficient to invalidate a rule.' '7 However, the court acknowledged that it must, nonetheless, be possible to ascertain
the intent of the drafters." 8 In the case of rule 8.4(h), it is not
112.

MINNESOTA RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 8.4(h) at cmt. (1992).

113. 401 U.S. 154, 159 (1971). In Wadmond, the Court held that "[Ihong usage in
New York and elsewhere had given well-defined contours to [the loyalty] requirement .
I..."
Id. at 159; see supra note 71 and accompanying text.
114. See, e.g., In re Holtzman, 577 N.E.2d 30, 33 (N.Y. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct.
648 (1991); Committee on Professional Ethics & Conduct v. Durham, 279 N.W.2d
280, 284 (Iowa 1979); see supra notes 72-89 and accompanying text.
115. 361 N.W.2d 386 (Minn. 1985); see supra notes 93-94 and accompanying text.
116. Several other jurisdictions have contemplated antidiscrimination provisions
as expansive as Minnesota's but have explicitly rejected them. See infra note 151 and
accompanying text.
117. In re N.P., 361 N.W.2d 386, 394 (Minn. 1985).
118. Id. (citing Getter v. Travel Lodge, 260 N.W.2d 177, 180 (Minn. 1977)).
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at all clear whether the drafters intended sanctions for all discrimination, or only "serious" discrimination.
Rule 8.4(h) is broadly worded and is thus open to subjective
and diverse interpretations. The rule states:
Whether a discriminatory act reflects adversely on a lawyer's fitness as a lawyer shall be determined after consideration of all the circumstances, including (1) the seriousness
of the act, (2) whether the lawyer knew that it was prohibited by statute or ordinance, (3) whether it was part of a
pattern of prohibited conduct, and (4) whether it was committed in connection with the lawyer's professional
activities.1

19

The comment to Rule 8.4(h) states that all relevant circumstances, including the four factors listed above, will be considered in determining whether the act reflects adversely on a
lawyer's fitness.' 2 ° The factors listed are not necessarily
2
weighted equally, nor are they exclusive.' 1
The language of Rule 8.4(h) violates due process in two
ways. First, in determining whether discrimination reflects adversely on a lawyer's fitness to practice courts will determine
the "seriousness" of the discrimination. However, the determination of what constitutes serious discrimination is entirely
subjective.' 2 2 This determination is further complicated by the
fact that no objective criteria are available to measure the severity of the discriminatory act. For example, the Minnesota
Human Rights Act' 23 does not categorize any discriminatory
act as more serious than any other.
The language of the rule implies that an objective hierarchy
exists which categorizes unlawful discriminatory acts from least
serious to most serious. It is difficult, if not impossible, to determine which discriminatory acts are more serious than
others. Is gender discrimination more egregious than sexual
harassment? Is public accommodation discrimination based
119.

MINNESOTA RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 8.4(h) (1992).

120. Id. at cmt.
121. Id.

122. Justice White has argued that an attorney should not be disbarred under a
general standard of conduct if reasonable attorneys would differ in appraising the
propriety of the conduct. See In re Ruffalo, 390 U.S. 544, 556 (1968) (White, J., concurring). Considering the diversity of opinion in the legal profession, it is almost
certain that reasonable attorneys will differ over the issue of what constitutes "serious
discrimination."
123. MINN. STAT. §§ 363.01-363.15 (1992).
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on race more repugnant than housing discrimination based on
sexual preference? Problems arise as to who makes this determination and under what criteria. While some may argue that
certain unlawful discriminatory acts are inherently more serious than others, the rationale of such arguments is likely to be
entirely subjective. The use of a subjective factor to define the
scope of the rule does little to elucidate what type of discriminatory acts adversely reflect on a lawyer's fitness.
Second, the rule is unconstitutionally vague because it expressly states that the list of factors to be considered in determining a lawyer's fitness to practice is nonexclusive. 1 24 Thus,
the rule fails to give notice of all factors that may be considered
in determining whether a discriminatory act adversely reflects
on a lawyer's fitness. Other factors may be used in this determination, and the rule provides no clear guidance to practitioners as to what these factors might be.
In addition, Rule 8.4(h) is flawed in its attempt to regulate
attorney conduct that is unrelated to the attorney's practice of
law. While attorneys clearly have unique obligations to the
public in light of their status as officers of the court, these responsibilities are not sufficient to sanction restraining attorneys of their rights in relation to the public in general. 25
Third, the amendment is inconsistent with the comment to
Rule 8.4, which states that attorneys should be professionally
answerable only for offenses that indicate a lack of qualities relevant to the practice of law. According to the comment, these
offenses include violence, dishonesty, and breach of trust or
serious interference with the administration ofjustice.126 Minnesota's Rule 8.4(h), however, now requires attorneys to be
professionally answerable for "offenses" that fall outside the
defined categories.
B.

Antidiscrimination Provisions Implemented in OtherJurisdictions

Professional antidiscrimination provisions are currently in
place not only in Minnesota but also in the District of Columbia, 1 27 New Jersey,

28

New York, 129 Rhode Island,13 and Ver-

124. See MINNESOTA RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 8.4 cmt. (1992).
125. See Rhode, supra note 24, at 510.
126. See MINNESOTA RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 8.4 cmt. (1992).
127. The District of Columbia's Rules of Professional Conduct state in pertinent
part, "[a] lawyer shall not discriminate against any individual in conditions of em-
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mont. l ' l However, other jurisdictions have limited the scope
ployment because of the individual's race, color, religion, national origin, sex, age,
marital status, sexual orientation, family responsibility, or physical handicap." DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 9.1 (1992).
128. Rule 8.4 of the New Jersey Rules of Professional Conduct provides, in pertinent part:
It is professional misconduct for a lawyer to: ...
(g) engage, in a professional capacity, in conduct involving discrimination
(except employment discrimination unless resulting in a final agency orjudicial determination) because of race, color, religion, age, sex, sexual orientation, national origin, marital status, socioeconomic status, or handicap
where the conduct is intended or likely to cause harm.
NEWJERSEY RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 8.4(g) (1990).
The comment to Rule 8.4(g) provides, in pertinent part:
This rule . . . is intended to make discriminatory conduct unethical when

engaged in by lawyers in their professional capacity. It would, for example,
cover activities in the court house, such as a lawyer's treatment of court support staff, as well as conduct more directly related to litigation; activities
related to practice outside of the court house, whether or not related to
litigation, such as treatment of other attorneys and their staff; bar association and similar activities; and activities in the lawyer's office and firm. Except to the extent that they are closely related to the foregoing, purely
private activities are not intended to be covered by this rule amendment,
although they may possibly constitute a violation of some other ethical rule.
Nor is employment discrimination in hiring, firing, promotion, or partnership status intended to be covered unless it has resulted in either an agency
or judicial determination of discriminatory conduct. The Supreme Court
believes that existing agencies and courts are better able to deal with such
matters, that the disciplinary resources required to investigate and prosecute discrimination in the employment area would be disproportionate to
the benefits to the system given remedies available elsewhere, and that limiting ethics proceedings in this area to cases where there has been an adjudication represents a practical resolution of conflicting needs.
Id. at cmt.
129. The New York Code of Professional Responsibility states in pertinent part:
A lawyer shall not . . . (6) Unlawfully discriminate in the practice of law,
including in hiring, promoting or otherwise determining conditions of employment, on the basis of age, race, creed, color, national origin, sex, disability, or marital status. Where there is available a tribunal of competent
jurisdiction, other than a Departmental Disciplinary Committee, a complaint
of professional misconduct based on unlawful discrimination shall be
brought before such tribunal in the first instance. A certified copy of a determination by such a tribunal, which has become final and enforceable, and
as to which the right to judicial or appellate review has been exhausted,
finding that the lawyer has engaged in an unlawful discriminatory practice
shall constitute primafacie evidence of professional misconduct in a disciplinary proceeding.
NEW YORK CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 1-102(A)(6) (1992).
130. The Rhode Island Rules of Professional Responsibility states in pertinent
part: "It is professional misconduct for a lawyer to ... (d) engage in conduct that is
prejudicial to the administration of justice, including but not limited to harmful or
discriminatory treatment of litigants, jurors, witnesses, lawyers, and others based on
race, nationality, or sex." RHODE ISLAND RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule
8.4(d) (1992).
131. The Vermont Code of Professional Responsibility provides, in pertinent
part: "A lawyer shall not: . . . (6) [d]iscriminate against any individual because of his
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of the rule to activities related to the attorney's professional
role. Furthermore, some of these jurisdictions have procedural requirements that must3 2be satisfied before disciplinary
proceedings can be initiated.1

No other states that have implemented antidiscrimination
provisions seek to regulate discriminatory acts that occur in the
attorney's private life. Rather, these other states merely prohibit attorney discrimination in a professional capacity or in
the context of employment. The New Jersey Supreme Court
has stated that "purely private activities are not intended to be
covered by this rule."' 13 3 New York's rule is expressly limited
to discriminatory acts involving the practice of law.' 34 Rhode
Island's rule only addresses conduct "prejudicial to the administration ofjustice" and focuses on discriminatory treatment of
participants in the judicial system."3 5 Finally, the rules in Vermont and the District
of Columbia apply only to employment
6
discrimination.

3

Antidiscrimination rules implemented in other jurisdictions
also contain various procedural safeguards absent in Minnesota's rule. For example, New Jersey's rule requires a final adjudication by an administrative or judicial tribunal-other than
a professional responsibility board-before an attorney is subject to discipline. 137 Thus, groundless allegations never reach
professional responsibility review boards. Further, to constitute misconduct under NewJersey's rule, the attorney's actions
must be intended or likely to cause harm. 3 8 Also, in cases of
employment discrimination, the rule requires a final judicial or
administrative determination prior to professional disciplinary
9
proceedings.

s

Rules adopted by the District of Columbia, Rhode Island,
or her race, color, religion, ancestry, national origin, sex, place of birth or age, or
against a qualified handicapped individual, in hiring, promoting or otherwise determining the conditions of employment of that individual." VERMONT CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY

DR 1-102(A)(6) (1992).

132. See infra note 137 and accompanying text.
133. Id. at cmt.
134. NEW YORK CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 1-102 (A)(6) (1992).
135. RHODE ISLAND RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 8.4(d) (1992).
136. See VERMONT CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 1-102(A)(6) (1992);
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 9.1 (1992).
137. NEW JERSEY RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 8.4(g) cmt.

138. Id.
139. Id.
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and Vermont, also limit the potential for the rule's abuse. For
example, the District of Columbia's rule permits discrimination complaints to be deferred until substantially similar complaints filed and pending with human rights agencies are
resolved. 4 0
Thus, antidiscrimination provisions in other states provide
substantive protection because they limit an attorney's exposure to discipline to the scope of the attorney's actions as an
attorney. The rules also provide various procedural safeguards once the disciplinary process is initiated.
By contrast, Minnesota's antidiscrimination rule contains
none of the substantive or procedural safeguards found in the
rules of other jurisdictions. Minnesota's rule may extend to
activities entirely unconnected to an attorney's practice of law.
Further, the rule does not require an administrative or judicial
finding prior to the initiation of proceedings by the professional responsibility board, nor does it require a finding of intent to discriminate. Rather, the rule merely contemplates a
"violation." 1'4
In the absence of such safeguards, there is an increased likelihood that the rule may be used as a tool for harassment or
intimidation.' 42 The broad scope, ambiguous language, and
absence of procedural safeguards within the language of Rule
8.4(h) may falsely subject attorneys to liability for discriminatory actions. In fact, the language and scope of the rule may
4
actually create a climate that encourages false charges.1 1
Charges later proven false have the ability to severely damage
an attorney's reputation.
140. DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 9.1 cmt.
(1992).
141. In drafting the rule, the discrimination subcommittee recommended a rule
that "does not require a proven violation of a statute or ordinance" because "there
may be technical reasons, such as the statute of limitations or other procedural reasons, why a matter may have been dismissed ..

" DISCRIMINATION SUBCOMMITTEE
MINUTES, RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT CoMMirrEE,July 5, 1990 (on file with the
William Mitchell Law Review).
142. See ProposedRule Targets DiscriminatoryActivity, MSBA IN BRIEF, July 1991, at 4.
143. Members of the discrimination subcommittee recognized this possibility.
Phyllis Karasov, co-chair of the discrimination subcommittee, stated that "the subcommittee's goal was not to create a climate encouraging discrimination charges, but
to provide the bar with a clear, usable measure of what constitutes discrimination,
and to suggest guidelines the Lawyers Professional Responsibility Board can follow
in determining whether discipline is appropriate." (quoting Phyllis Karasov, co-chair
of the discrimination subcommittee).
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According to the co-chair of the discrimination subcommittee of the Minnesota State Bar Association's Professional Conduct Committee, the four factors of Rule 8.4(h), which are to
be considered in determining whether a discriminatory act reflects adversely on a lawyer's fitness, were intended to protect
attorneys from baseless charges of misconduct. 14 4 However,
since the factors themselves are vague and provide no notice of
the conduct to avoid, these factors will likely be ineffective as a
screen against unfounded charges.
C.

Appropriateness of ProfessionalRules as a Means of Social
Change

Over the years, ethics codes have gone from advisory guidelines, to rules implementing ethical concerns, to their present
form, where they have assumed the power of black letter
law.' 45 However, the proper role of professional rules is becoming increasingly unclear. 14 6 Besides being used to regulate
extraprofessional conduct, there is a growing tendency to use
these rules as standards in malpractice cases and other private
14 7
causes of action.
One of the most difficult issues underlying Rule 8.4(h) is
whether legal disciplinary rules-ostensibly designed to protect clients and the administration of justice-should be used
as tools of social policy. 148 Minnesota's rules once drew a dis144. Id. at 4. As one participant noted during a public hearing preceding the
adoption of the rule, the rule could have a detrimental effect by causing lawyers to
avoid service on organizational boards due to fear of future discrimination charges
and disciplinary action. Id. While the members of the subcommittee acknowledged
these problems, the subcommittee failed to address them. Id. at 8.
145. See supra discussion at section II.A.; see also Geoffrey C. Hazard Jr. and Cameron Beard, A Lawyer's PrivilegeAgainst Self-Incriminationin ProfessionalDisciplinaryHear-

ings, 96

YALE

L.J. 1060, 1075 (1987).

146. See, e.g., George L. Hampton IV, Toward an Expanded Use of the Model Rules of
ProfessionalConduct, 4 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 655 (1991). Michael J. Hoover, The Model
Rules of ProfessionalConduct and Lawyer MalpracticeActions: The Gap Between Code and Common Law Narrows, 22 NEw ENG. L. REV. 595 (1988).

147. See Hampton, supra note 146, at 662.
148. Some may argue that professional rules ought to be used to encourage social
change, in light of an attorney's ethical responsibilities. Almost thirty years ago, Elliott Cheatham stated:
The law and its institutions change as social conditions change. They must
change if they are to preserve, much less advance, the political and social
values from which they derive their purpose and their life. This is true of
the most important of legal institutions, the profession of law. The profession, too, must change when conditions change in order to preserve and
advance the social values that are its reasons for being.
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tinction between personal and professional conduct. The
comment to Rule 8.4 states that lawyers should be professionally answerable only for offenses that indicate a lack of those
characteristics relevant to the practice of law.' 4 9 The fraud,
misrepresentation, and dishonesty prohibitions in Rule 8.4(c)
focus on the lawyer's honesty, fiduciary duties to a client, and
the ability to tell the truth. 150 Clearly, Rule 8.4 was initially
designed to regulate lawyers' professional activities, rather
than to implement social policy. However, Rule 8.4(h) has the
aspirational goal of promoting equality and attempts to use the
disciplinary floor of Rule 8.4(h) to mandate social change. It is
inappropriate to expand rules of professional conduct to private activities, unrelated to the profession, in an effort to implement general social policy.
D. Alternative Remedies for Discrimination
The question remains as to whether Rule 8.4(h) is necessary
to protect persons from discrimination by lawyers, or whether
it creates additional problems, while failing to effectively further the elimination of discrimination. New York and New
Jersey have recently considered expansive antidiscrimination
provisions similar to Minnesota's amended rule. Both states
rejected the proposed revisions, in part, because state and federal statutes provide adequate remedial remedies.' 5' One subElliott E. Cheatham, Availability of Legal Services: The Responsibility of the Industrial Lawyer
and the Organized Bar, 12 U.C.L.A. L. REV., 438, 440 (1965). See also Suzannah Bex
Wilson, Eliminating Sex Discriminationin the Legal Profession: The Key to Widespread Social

Reform, 67 IND. L.J. 817 (1992). In her article, Wilson argues that the initial impetus
for changing society's views on sexual discrimination must come from the legal profession. Id. Ms. Wilson also argues that this is appropriate on a practical level
because [the legal profession] is uniquely linked to all segments constituting
the public sphere-the judiciary, the legislature, and the business sector.
The majority of judges are lawyers, as are many legislators, and employers
inevitably interact with lawyers at some point in time. Thus, lawyers are
capable of influencing all segments of the public. [There are also] [e]thical
considerations [which] support this proposal: the profession that represents
justice should not be guilty of treating individuals in an unlawful and unfair
manner. Ending sex discrimination within the legal profession will benefit
the profession by enabling it to truly represent as both an advocate and a
source of justice.
Id. at 817-18.
149. See MINNESOTA RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 8.4 cmt. (1992).
150. Id.
151. See Marjorie E. Gross, The Long Process of Change: The 1990 Amendments To The
New York Code Of Professional Responsibility, 18 FORDHAM URB. LJ. 283, 292-94 (1991)

(noting that the subject of discrimination is adequately covered by Federal antidis-
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committee recommended not adopting any rule for this very
reason. A past chairman of the ABA's Committee on Ethics
and Professional Responsibility has questioned whether antidiscrimination provisions fit into the types of professional responsibilities addressed by the model rules.152 Rather, the
chairman noted that both state and federal laws offer adequate
protection against discrimination.15 3 Thus, the discrimination
targeted by Rule 8.4(h) can be remedied by other means.
VI.

CONCLUSION

Rule 8.4(h) of the Minnesota Rules of Professional Conduct
violates due process because it is unconstitutionally vague. In
addition, the amendment to the rule does not comply with the
judicial "fitness to practice" standard because the factors
which determine whether the discriminatory act reflects adversely on the lawyer's fitness to practice are purely subjective.
Reasonable attorneys may differ as to whether the commission
of a discriminatory act, prohibited by federal statute, state statute, or local ordinance, reflects adversely on a lawyer's fitness
as a lawyer. Accordingly, the rule fails to give notice of the
type of conduct that attorneys must avoid. In addition, Rule
8.4(h) extends regulation to extraprofessional noncriminal
conduct. Minnesota's rule is not only the most expansive of
any in the country, it is also clearly outside the intended scope
of the professional rules. The Minnesota Rules of Professional
Conduct are inappropriate as a means of implementing social
policy.
Discrimination of any sort is repugnant. However, society,
through its elected bodies, has ample means to denounce such
behavior. When professional rules are used as tools of social
policy, problems of application will inevitably arise. Determining their proper application implicitly requires that a decision
be made as to the social desirability of the policy that provides
the basis for discipline. Who should be entrusted to make this
decision? The Minnesota Rules of Professional Conduct
crimination statutes and the New York Human Rights Act). See also NEW JERSEY
RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT, Rule 8.4(g) (1992). For the text of this rule, see
supra note 128.
152. Faye A. Silas, Lawyer Conduct, 72 A.B.A.J. May 1, 1986, at 31 (quoting Robert
Hetlage, past chair of the ABA's Committee on Ethics and Professional
Responsibility).
153. Id.
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should not be used to implement a desired social policy, nor
be turned into a laundry list of remedies devised to eliminate
society's ills. This is especially the case when the rules seek to
regulate activities in an attorney's private life and these activities are unrelated to the attorney's practice of law.
Andrew D. Pugh
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